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Edward Geary Lansdale, at his home in McLean, Virginia. 
L. South Carolina. They never seemed to get above a 1000 feet 
mayb e . They served coffee at every bump in the air. [illegible 
noises to indic a te his confusion at having to hold coffee during air 
turbulence. J 
C: Waitresses or whatever, stewardesses, san be so surly. 
L: Oh yeah. [illegible[ Who knows? 
D~-t+o.... 
C: I was always fond of Delta but I don't seem to get on .t.J:i.--e-r-e flights 
anymore. Maybe they've have they gone out of business? 
L: I don't think so; I think they're still there. I used to go down 
there to Fort Walton Beach, the Air Force. I love that part of Florda 
just right ; ihere, I don't like it further west on the Panhandle, but 
Ft Walton Beach has sort of hicks from Alabama, farmers 
C: They call it 
L: That's what 
disarming 
the Redneck Riviera. 
-f '1 ti-f +o /11\- e- • 
it is. It's sort of old-fashioned Florida. ~ That 's 
,,.,,..e, , a_ ro ""'-"' d 
and rather charming {o The troops a re ou t--e-fl the air 
bases there get a real good living and they all have boats and they 
live on a little inlet 
(Jl/V\ 
in the gulf and Vsail around and play and not 
make much in the way of pay and live real handsomely. 
~tt- 5 
C: Well, it's a dirty job but somebody ~ to do it. 
L: Yeah. [laughter]. Right. 
I 
C: You left Vietnam for the first time in 60 what? 
L: I left Vietnam in 156. 
C 1 56. h : T1 en you 
L: Yeah. Yeah. 
C: Then you went back to work with Nguyen Cao Ky. Is that correct? 
L: Nooo. That was the end of my first tour in Vietnam in 156. I 
went back on several visits there to look over the problems, including 
one White House sponsored investigation .. On military assistance 
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programs. C am e b a ck t~ s e c o n d t i me , I w a s out of the servic e already, 
I v--ed-d't - ; + '-"-' .,,_ :s J 
0- ~ IL$ 
.Lhad retired Ain65. That's wh e n Ky ~ prime minister 1 11 
I 
65 . . Thieu was 
chief of state and Ky was prime minister. Cabot Lodge had asked me to 
go out as his assistant, which I did. He gave me the rank of minister 
in the foreign service. It put me in the foreign service reserve as 
pst.. - t G) 
an SR-1, that's the first, #1 rank. And then as a minister. They 
ed 
MXMMXK want/me to become an ambassador and take over one of the paci-
fication posts but they were running pacification in such a way that 
I didn't want any part of it, I didn't believe in it, so I didn't do 
C: On your first 
I 
tour in Vietnam in the 5Os, what sort of relationship 
did you have with the CIA? 
L: Uh, I shouldn; 't go into that at all. I'll say this, tho. I've 
had very close relationships with them. They've helped me tremendously 
I give my word on sertain things that I'd never discuss them. I 
never have. CIA has said some things from time to time, but I haven't. 
Some of their personnel have served with me out there. The last time 
I was in Vietnam, about half my people were from the CIA that I picked 
o u t t o h e 1 p me . I h a d s om e a rm y a n d U S I A a n d S t a t e De p a r t me n t p e o p 1 e 'JI',/ 1' -1-- k 1N1..e.. • 
W or-I <.. : " ~ 
I've always had very , very cordial Arelationships working with them. 
On some of the things that I wanted to do, they've quietly gone in 
and funded them in a very idealistic manner, very unselfish on their 
part, h e lping like Operation Brotherhood in the Philippines which was 
sponsored by the International Jaycees. 
C.,,t, '1A- e, i " J 
was helped or generated by CIA whether by 
+-ke.. .TC!. ls 
sponsors they pushed into helping ~ i, 
I'm sure some of the funding 
them directly or by other 
0 n '-l- ka...-f-. \}Q.,r( 
That was a :v--~ humanitarian 
type of project and did a tremendous amount of good out there. And 
helped our side tremendously. They did the same thing in the 
Philippin e s with some of the things we were doing. They l e t me know 
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at the time that th e y were doing tha ~ to help the efforts we'd gotten 
started XNH in. They thot very highly of some of the prO,R!jects I +' 
heC-a'lll.4?.- re a.. I : :;, ' c..., • 
was pushing people into and were trying to make them work / \ But I was 
always a regular officer in the air force out there and that never 
changed . I remember the air attache in Saigon one time got up on 
f',e,, 
his high horse and ~ thought he outranked me . He was amazed and 
shocked to find out that I outranked him and that I was a regular 
officer . I ' d gone in, let them put me in as♦ an ass i stant air 
attache and ¢hey would n' t even give me a chair to sit on, r/J 1 et 
alone a desk or anything in his office . I had to operate out of my 
s ha..6 /J •/ 
hat , so to s p eak . Very ~ -Y· treatment ~{ some of these people . soi--+-
But I didn't care as long as I co u 1 dA get in the good fight . An d 
the United States was ~ n ' t then equipped to combat t h e communist 
type of warfare . 
We aren 't t oday! The mili t ary services aren ' t ready for it ment ~ ly 
at all in any of their training. They don't understand what they ' re 
up against . They think they ' re in another kind of war, and they 
aren't . If you know how to fight and you get into a fight like that, 
wkere.- YO LL C., t.L-'1. 
all you want is a place t.-0- swing hard at the enemy and hope to connect 
once in awhile and knock them outof position and go ahead a little . 
L 
A l l 1:- was doing f was 
- ~~ ~ 
try' to get through this clutter of US officialdom 
oVer i'ri'fi, CL 
,.t-o g e t ~-o-a- point where I could get some blows into the fight . It 
that 
was very different from World War II or Korea. Things/counted with 
the enemy and would lead him to make his moves were things that the 
_ _., -r I S 
US never recognized as hav i ng happened. '.I.-- Amazing. I would see them 
and understand them and start getting excited . Everybody would 
wonder why I was excited . And it ' s still that way! It worries 
that the country that I 
(:)r 
c...J k.en 
love doesn't understand .~ it's getting 
me 
hurt. ~ getting ready for a showdown that it thinks it knows 
-4-
+ "'- e..y 
how to meet, but i-e- don't understand the rules of the game. 
C: Is there anyone within the active list today that is carrying on 
in your tradition? 
L: I don't know. I hope ther e is. I'm sure there must be some 
·~s 
people that are . if there }di- a guy one of the elements 
"' is t?--appreciation of psychological operations and a very big one, 
ct-11c::I fhel'I 
~ linking in political actions to that and sending off from 
a..c..-/-i o•d (?) 
that11 some 
military~ and economic axioms. But I haven't seen such a person, 
w , +h 
maybe going down and talking about El Salvador JA1" people in th e 
Pentagon, maybe I'll bump into some~ hen. I hope so. 
C: Take along some water so you can baptize him. 
L: Oh, I'll just go up and tell him I'll support him the whole way, 
which I will. That might kill him off, I don't know. I got to watch 
it a little bit. It' s strange. Now CIA doesn't know how to fight 
either. There used to be some wonderful Americans in there. They'd 
backstop these plays just out of big hearts. It felt good and it was 
, + o ~ 1 you... l<.n ,; w . 
the American way to go $ 0 I used to I remember once I was invited 
up to Harvard to talk to the Nieman fellows who were up there to give 
an informal lecture to them one evening. It was a gathering of the 
current Nieman fellows and some of the graduate Nieman fellows, former 
ones. There were about30 of them up there. I said, Everybody says 
I did clandestine things. But they were actions taken that essentially 
• followed the American principles. The principles I think the 
essence of the American way of doing things is the prom i se in the 
Declaration of Independence about the status of an individual. And 
then the 1st 10 amendments. And I said show how to implement 
vJ Lu,..,+-that. The essence is th e re; it's not the 
6 0 wa--s +o 
whole thing. Jt l was always 
trying to behave within the promise and the 
promise in the 1st 10 amendments, something 
fulfillment of that 
U-l ou..J d.. 
that fit within that, 
that at any point wh e n any body started y e lling on that, we'd just 
so 
-5- / 
let the American p e ople kno~ and they'd support it. It's well within 
what we all share and believe. That's very strong, and the people 
where I was out in Asia felt that was the American way of doing 
1>J tt.."\ +e-cL 4-- k .._ -1--, 
things 
and they'd go along with it, t o s av e t h em s e 1 v e s I h o m w-a&-Fn!-lt;--~01-1.-_;;...J.l.aa..-L. 
-, /,t IL f 1 -5, <...., 
I "'1 very understandable thing by people, 
but our essential, basic beliefs~ , our 
not our 
ideals 
form of government 
5h.c<-r e s 
t h a t m a n k i n d ~-s--h-e--s-
with us. When you get that as the basis for your actions in warfare, 
why you get an awful lot of allies and brothers with you, in th e fight. 
The enemy acts differently toward you. He really does. I used to 
respect the e nemy and I think they used to r e spect me. I think it 
scared them a lot of times. In Vi e tnam, the last time I went out, 
a retired major general in the air force, was a foreign service offi-
cer. A diplomat and an assistant to the ambassador. So all th e 
1,4-- f 
Vietnamese, including the enemy~XKXXM in Hanoi, said I was s e cretly 
the h e ad of CIA. Immediately. And I was! To them! And the CIA came 
,O<-<-h d 
up and complained to me. They said, a lot of the people w.p- here think 
we"re the head of the CIA wearing the black hats and doing all the 
wrong things and you're the head of the CIA wearing the white hats 
and doing all the right things." I said, "Just wear a white hat 
from now on and do the right things. They'll start changing their 
minds about you. I tell them I'm not the head, but nobody believes 
it anymor e , so why tell them? I think the enemy was afraid 
a nnounce on the radio that they we re going to com e and kill me. 
I used to hold a party and put loudspeakers out in the street 
inviting them to com e on in and try. "Take your try. Tonight's the 
night." Have music and everything at the house, but they wouldn't 
I think they 
5 e creA--fy 
of people4 all over 
were afraid the CI Axan: wouldn't by millions 
l n ~ r -~ 
the country would rise up !\a nd smite them, if they 
tri e d that. That was a good and psychological defens e . 
-6- / 
C: Well, without breaking your promises or being specific, is there 
anything more you can tell me about it? your relationships with the 
CIA? I'll even turn my recorder off. 
lo, 
L: [laughs]' Some of t he people in the CIA were very jealous. One 7 1J 
tt-"d. +/,,.,e. t» ,._, ~ htt-ile--
be ha vi n g/j was guy wrote a book--Smith--that said th at the way I was 
a scandal and all the real professionals in the CIA were infuriated. 
They might have been. I don't know. I know that the station chief 
in Saigon tried to teeat me like dirt when I went there in ' 54. 
C: That's strange. 
L: Oh, very much so. He [chuckles[ This is off the record. I 
went in to see him and I didn't like his mannerisms at all, his 
attitude, and there was a talking down his nose to me, "This 
stupid goddamned amateur, get out of 
eke.. ~ s 
move th e pieces around on thisn board 
our way and let us pros really 
look here." I had wanted to 
up certain things that I suspected he was doing. So I asked him, 
I said, will you he had a lot of cablegrams and mail on his desk. 
give me some information about and I looked over at his filing 
system and I saw where the H~ for the Hoa Hoa were over so his back 
would be fully turned to me for a time and I asked him some questions 
+It-A--+- v->e--re., 
about the Hoa Hoa, technical and detailed. He got up and looked 
[the answers up]. So I read a ll the mail on his desk and I had to 
pick it up and leaf through it. He didn't 
t.,4J ha.+ o.. n tLw.a.feu,.. :t: w~-s 
1 e c t u r e d ab o u t Jl ,a l:Q a t e 11 r s..,. I f o u n d out t ha t 
ever catch me. He still 
he was doing things that 
were duplicitous inside the US government, things he should have been 
ashamed of. S 0 LaTER, We got to a point where he was doing things that 
really a nger ed me, holding up the teamwork of the US. I invited him 
over to my house to meet me and made sure it was an empty house, my 
u)e,r-e..0-1( jone 1 
people who lived with me and my staffA the servants were out. And I 
told him that. This house is empty. You'r e younger than I am, you're 
-7-
heavier, you got the reach on me, you're in better condition that I 
am. But you dirty son of a bitch, I'm gonaa practically I want 
r:~a.:d 
to clobber you. A This is what you did. And I told him some of the 
things that i'd just found 
iHJ.> j. 
out. What he was doing was going against 
the b-g-e-rt interests of the 
in the sense of harmonious 
country, not in a sense of treason, but 
~ -t- w w e, ,e cl o .' "1 . 
teamwork 'Y He was carping at some of the 
officials that we had to work with. We really had to work in harmony 
with each other. I said, somebody's got to beat 
h e r e-lo y a. jJ j,J ?> i' >1 + YIA y '5 e I {:. 
~-a l} p 0-i rHe:e::fi:=t; to do it. He wouldn't fight with 
you up and ..:w-m-~ 
he +LL-rne..L tt- 11 J 
me and~ finally M' 
f=" I I J ~ 
> Ji L' 7 
t::ur n ~ d ;;. r:i ~ ran out of the house. He overweighed me by 15-20 pounds 
and he was in good condition, physically. I wrote a letter to Wash-
ington and I said, fire that son of a bitch, get him out of here. 
Well, they withdrew him from there. It was just once in awhile I'd 
" F-run across people like that. He was apparently a friend ~ this guy 
,J:'d Jov,e_. +0 h,V1A.j 
X~HXX Smith who wrote a book later and said ~ terrible things n about how 
I threw my weight around in Saigon. For example, I analysed what the 
Geneva accords meant, when I saw them. I got th e things and read the 
agreements, and was starting to think of them in terms, first of all, 
of what the politburo had in mind to agre e to this, wh a t the french 
were doing you could understand, what the Americans and British were 
pushing for in th e re you could understand, but what the politburo 
had in mind to permit ~ertain things to be signed off and how they'd 
interpret the words, I saw we were running out of time pretty much 
to get anything done to remedy the situation so I was trying to get 
as much done on our side as possible. I don't think any of the other 
Americans felt that time pressure that I felt. 
and talking to the our commanding general, was 
C: Iron Mik e O'Daniel? 
I remember going down 
-8-
L: Iron Mike o•~aniel. Iron Mike was a wonderful person but he didn't 
quite feel the pressure. He wanted to get 
The ambasador was a very good guy, we were 
going and get 
Fr; e,Vl d..-5 
great t:-laing s . 
things done. 
He wanted to 
do the right things, but he didn't feel the same pressure. I said, 
d ., "~ he ~o ,-,e 
There isn't time, you know. We gotto get this .t ... ¥-P P a kixx 
such and such a date, and so forth. So they were thinking of 
'{'" 
I brought 1 up at a country team meeting. I said, we gotta do something 
to get at least 2 million people down out of 
a. r r "- rt j' e wt e-vz + 
accords a-~ They were talking 
the north, under this 
about a few thousand Geneva 
coming down. The ambassador was worrying; he'd talked to the Red 
,!, ,,;,11. e, 
Cross, maybe getting some bandages and a few other Ahelp 
I 
for a 100 or 
SO. I said, No. Let's ask CINCPAC to send the fleet and pick them up +~~r~J 
bring them down and lets go up to the North and help these people get 
that 
out of there. So I wrote a message ks/the ambassador signed off on 
and asked the fleet .. . CINCPAC, to send the fleet, which they did. 
Incidentally, I put my tongue in my cheek sx afterwards and sent 
a "well done" to the US navy for heir refugee lift. You do that if 
you're around boasting that you've done it which I've never done. 
You can do stuff like that and get away with almost anything so long 
~-0,..., 
as its the right thing and you do it for the right reasons , -ie-tw?i..;~kL ....,....__> 
-fry i11:1 -.../.-., d,, . 
I went down I said, the Vietnamese down President Diem 
doesn't understand the urgency. I got the ambassador to come along 
with me. I said, what we've got to have here is an agency to handle 
all the refugees which I don't want it to be like what happen3d in 
Israel, put up in camps and living in camps forever, afterwards, and 
in other countrie i s. We've got to get people back into useful occu-
pations real fast here and not live in tents the rest of their lives. 
We've got ~ - a director of this whole thing that we Americans can 
live with. I talked Iron Mike ODaniel into letting me have some of 
-9-
MAAG troops to work on refugee affairs, for which some of them never 
forgave me (chuckle). Including a guy who's retired in Florida now, 
~~ 11 · 
--e-1:-ct"" general, retired, (chuckle) was telling me how he was standing 
there in the rain, getting the refugees off a boat and into an over-
night camp and they handed him the babies, two of them, and they were 
all wet and wetting all over his uniform. He says "Goddam Lansdale 
got me into this. Ed, if you'd been there, I'd have shot you on the 
spot." I said, "you learned about peoples' warfare doing that. Good." 
So the ambassador and I went in to see Diem, and I had fxNm some very 
capable Vietnamese that I knew were very loyal to Diem and the ad-
Ministration ih the South, out in the halls of the presidential 
u..1"'-.c. ,- <-
palace, was ~ it waS, and telling them, when the plebiscite came 
up between north and south, we had ~to have more people on our side 
vo+e_ 
to ~ our way, and we'd try to patrol the polling places and make 
sure we got an honest count and we didn't have communists cheating 
there. It would give us a chance for the future. I said, we need 
at least 2 million down. We never got that. We got a million. 
And the ambassador was interpreting for me in French. He looked at 
me--it was Don Heath--and he says, Ed, I'm the ambassador here. I 
shouldn't be interpreting for a colonel in the air force on the 
subject of refugees; it's very embarrassing for the U.S. And I 
said, Diem understandxs English enough, don't you? And I said to 
him, The ambassador's a friend and 
help you. You're a vietnamese and 
I'm a 
we're 
friend and we're trying 
trying to h).i p you. ~ 
to 
Yeah, said Diem, I underst / and. I know what you're doing. I said, 
so forget being embarrassed I said, have a special commissioner for 
refugees. He said, I don't know who could run such a thing. How 
about so-and-so, I said. There're out in the hall right now. Why 
don't you call them in? So he called them in and said something; I 
-10-
couldnt tell what he did. He bawled them out in Vietnamese. There're 
close friends but I've never found out what he said, but they turned 
and looked at me, they were highly embarrassed, they said, we're sorry, 
we can't do it, we can't do it, and went out. I don't know what he 
told them, not to push themselves with foreigners. But he made them 
1-,,: ... sel C::: • 
assistant commissioners, he picked the commissioner/ 10--f t:he tn1ng. But 
we got that done. You only get that when the events of the moment 
~ o re,:. e, e., 
are there, becomes, w-h-e-n you s-e-e whats happening and can tell what's 
happening in a struggle like that, and get the forces on our side 
galvanized into an action. It doesn~ matter who you are if you got 
a voice and don't let the little formalities of life stop you at all. 
5onteb .. dy o--e- f-
You go ahead and act as the situation demands n and that's why you can 
get into the positions that you do. Diem understood that and so did 
the ambassador. The ambassador attended a lecture I gave up in New 
York years afterwards at the Council on Foreign Relations. I was 
talking out there and he came up to me after and said, Oh thank god! 
I thot you were going to say, All of you in this room, go out to 
Vietnam with me and I'd have found myself saying, Yeah, I'll go out 
with you. God. You get us aroused on foreign subjects. You see 
something urgent where we look at it and think, well, we'll have to 
go after this next year. 
Well, next year's going to be very different. You show MX 
where decisions'll be made before then. 
history that's occuring to us every day. 
This is just interpreting 
So when you act on that, 
you don't, the normal customary roles for - people don't apply .a..H-cl- a...,"''f 
more and you can do it. It's like the little dutch boy that stuck 
his thumb in the dike. If you're there and see something you suddenly f 
become something more than a little boy, you've got your thumb in the 
-11-
right place and everybody will acknowledge that that was the thing to 
do. 
C: Were you responsible during that exodus from north Vietnam for the 
slogan: 'the virgin Mary is moving south.? 
N: No. no. I had some psychological kRamx operatios teams. I'd 
taught 
It was 
the vietnamese army how to take some psychological actions. 
/2 ~ ,+-~ 
the only thing the French would initially } et me do .f--e- r the 
vietnamese army. They had a G-5 for psychological warfare in the 
Vietnames e army, and the French had--French officers--was the 
G-i, G-2, G-3, and G-4 of the Vietnamese army; but the vietnamese 
--I think it was a major--was the G-5 over in a separate building. 
I went over and they said, Al/right, you can play around. And they 
. J0e French psychOlogical warfare man was a colonel, reserve 
colonel, who taught Shakespeare at the Sorbonne. He was mentally 
old age, past his prime, and di d~~ think fast at all, ~i knew nothing 
about psy,M"chological operations. He had some wonderful equipment and 
the only one in the eHtire-e~eratie whole French forces that I'd 
found in 1 53 that knew what he was doing was a very young lieutenant 
colonel under the combat lines up in Hanoi, in the command up there, 
v e ry good, who'd gone to school in Hanoi and knew Giap and other 
('jO,,-,~t(y , 
, knew them personally and wanted to beat them f~ Talking with him, 
he just sparked with ideas and threw them back and we had a great 
time together in coming up with operations. He went and mounted 
them. I worked with the G-5 section and they had troops up in 
Hanoi and up in the northern area, Haiphong. He carried out a number 
of psy c hological operations. I think x they pulled this particular 
slogan themselves. 
I taught them how to spread rumors in marketplaces. To spread 
them in several places to get people talking, compare storaes, and 
-12-
-vf' I 
build a new thing ~ou t of t h e-nr. I d suggested they could d o/it about 
chinese troop operations in there. To let them think the Viet Minh 
in those days, the communist forces, had made a deal in letting the 
chinese armys down into past the border, raping women, misbehaving, 
stealing things. I got a query from Washington: Would I please 
find out if there was any truth to the fact that two chinese regular 
vf 
divisions were in north vietnam? I went out and started checking Ain 
Hanoi and Haiphong in 154 and Jesus, it turns out that these teams 
were telling that story; I'd gotten up myself to about a platoon--
a small group in there--just enuf to frighten people. I said, 
I want them moving out of th%is area of communist control and that's 
NB~ one way to start getting people moving and worrying that 
the chinese were coming along with the communists. I had to wire 
back to Washington and say It's not a true story, but something I 
started. I'm sorry. Mea culpa. I also had vietnamese civilians 
who were nationalists who were very patriotic, wanted to help do 
things, get into psychological operations on their own. We ran two 
operations up in 6fhe north that were so close to what the communists 
would do •that the communists inside the town went ahead and followed 
the orders that I gave them thru these vietnamese and the c ommunist 
headquarters outside Hanoi told them to cease and desist, that the 
-t\.-e.,( ' 
French or somebody must have done this ~ and the communists inside 
town thot those radio messages, the French must have broken the 
code, and were sending them these messages, se e , and kept on doing 
it. We distributed pamphlets, among 
k.o ..,.; 
try to hrl:-1: the people up there what 
others, and I was doing it to 
was going to happen. I had 
shopk e epers making inventory of what they had, to give to the local 
party, and the local party inside the town was in$isting on it 
+~ <2..-om. i,,t<L'1 ; s /--:::, C."'--. e_ 
themselves, for confiscation when the troops came in ~ That got an 
-13-
awful lot of people suddenly realizing that We ought to get the hell 
out of here. Which was the main thing I was trying to do. Say, 
"Reality is about coming here, and this is the way it looks." Bu 
in distributing leaflets up there, it was a civilian operation and 
the only guy caught was x the one who was a friend who was helping, w~s 
the chief of police up in Hanoi, a vietnamese. His friends were out 
distributing these leaflets, and if any of them were arrested, he was 
to get them out of jail right away. He thot they were having too 
much fun, they were telling where they were going distributing, so 
he got in and did it, and the French came along and the French 
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gendarme r i e~ put him in jail. They came and told me, Gee, our friend, 
the chief of police was arrested. I had to go to Diem and get him 
sprung out of jail. And Diem said, Gee, the guy's a traitor. I 
said, No, he's trying to help you and help the country. He's really 
on our side. And Diem couldn't understand that at all. That was 
too much duplicity for him. I said, No. He said, Did you pay him? 
I said, No, I don' £ t even know the guy. I said, I know these people, 
friends of mine, were doing it. I talked to them about things ~ to 
I 
do and theyd run out and do 
the country if they will. 
them. So I said, Let these people help 
)le s;:e ,•d 
WRxxxia~ 1 You got a lot of people supporting 
it that come in and ask me what to do and I tell them. And they 
shouldn't go to jail for doing that. 
C: On another topic, f general, you mentioned that you're familiar 
with Stanley Karnow's new book on vietnam. 
L: I ~ know about it. I have not read it. 
C: Well, hardly anybody has read it. It's a big book! 
L: Well, he sold many, many copies. 
C: What do you think of Karnow? 
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L: Uh, let me tell you what I suspect his book is that he produced. 
I think it is, it's a. an outline history of the communist 
disinformati ~ on campaign that they ran throughout the vietnam war 
out of Hanoi. All of it's in there which is derogatory to the 
United States and to the government of Saigon and uh, the misdeeds 
and so forth, and they're elaborating on them, and uh, I I 
have a gut feeling that he listens too hard to the arguments of the 
...t. k..c,·t-
other side and is too kindly disposed to the arguments Athey put 
forth. He came in and interviewed me for the PBS series. 
C: ib1 , I saw you on it. 
L: Well, it was a full day interview} here. 
C: Gee, you were on the screen for only 30 seconds. 
L: Yeah. Many hours that they I'm sure my answers didn't 
fit in with their outl9ok on the thing, I could tell. In the 
afternoon when I started getting tremendously sharply sick to the 
stomach, and I think it was just being on guard all the time, of 
seeing what my answers would be with what would be on the screen 
and back of my head; saying ~he Americans behaved very well, and 
so on, and they 're showing them beating up kids or old ladies 
or something, or napalm, kids screaming, and everything while I said 
that. The dirty lie sort of a thing. I my feeling was not to 
trust anything, so I was trying to put all my answers in terms that 
would belie pictures, too, counteract them, and I don't think that 
was the sort of stuff that they wanted to show. Yeah. I know they 
wrote me, the producers did, and asked if I would help, they'd run 
out of money and they were going to try to raise many millions more 
to finish their series, which they did 2-3 years later, and maybe 
/ 
tney used up all their film shooting me, who knows? But they brought 
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a whole crew into t ~ house, big crew. And I wrote them a letter, 
from the questions ac----------
/ 
F . 
END OF TAPE 
end of tape 
